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1Simplifying the Formal Verification of Safety
Requirements in Zone Controllers through Problem
Frames and Constraints based Projection
Zhengheng Yuan, Xiaohong Chen*, Jing Liu, Yijun Yu*, Haiying Sun, Tingliang Zhou, Zhi Jin
Abstract—Formal methods have been applied widely to ver-
ifying the safety requirements of Communication-Based Train
Control (CBTC) systems, while the problem situations could
be much simplified. In industrial practices of CBTC systems,
however, huge complexity arises, which renders those methods
nearly impossible to apply. In this paper, we aim to reduce the
state space of formal verification problems in Zone Controller,
a sub-system of a typical CBTC. We achieve the simplification
goal by reducing the total number of device variables. To do this,
two projection methods are proposed based on Problem Frames
and constraints, respectively. The Problem Frames based method
decomposes the system according to sub-properties through
functional decomposition, whilst the constraints based projection
method removes redundant variables. Our industrial case study
demonstrates the feasibility though an evaluation, confirming that
these two methods are effective in reducing the state spaces of
complex verification problems in this application domain.
Index Terms—Problem Frames Approach; Projection; Zone
Controller; Constraints; Formal Verification
I. INTRODUCTION
SAFETY is the key requirement for train control systems toavoid collisions. Unlike traditional train control systems
that use fixed blocks, the new generation of Communication-
Based Train Control (CBTC) systems use moving blocks
instead, which allows more trains to run on the same track
simultaneously. Since formal methods have successful appli-
cation in rail transit systems, e.g., Paris Metro Line 14 back in
1998 [1], their uses have been recommended by various safety
domain standards including EN50128 [2] and EN50129 [3].
Formal verification has also been applied, with limited
success, to a sub-system of CBTC, namely Computer In-
terlocking [4]. However, such a verification was feasible
only because a table of boolean equations could be used to
greatly simplify the interlocking sub-system. Apart from this
limited success in verifying the interlocking sub-system, other
parts of the CBTC had not been verified successfully, even
for a resourceful company, CASCO Signal Ltd.1. In 2012,
CASCO has been qualified for SIL-4, the highest level of
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safety standards, after three years of applying formal modeling
throughout the development of Zone Controllers (ZC). By
the end of such formal development, however, they failed to
verify ZC using the Prover model checker [5] associated with
SCADE [6] or any other existing formal verification tools.
Through an analysis of such failures, it was our belief that
the cause lies fundamentally in the complexity of ZC. ZC is
designed to help trains move into the right position. Its main
task is to tell how far the track in front of a train is safe for
its running, or professionally called, “claiming the Movement
Authority (MA)”. According to [7], ZC can be divided into
about 20 sub-systems, and there will be more modules when
being implemented. These modules interact with different
devices. By devices, we mean the entities that will interact
with ZC (sub-)systems. They not only refer to the equipment
such as signal lights (called signals in the domain), but also
including existing software such as Computer Interlocking
system, and virtual nodes such as Virtual Train Protection
(VTP), which is a logical enlargement of train. According
to IEEE standard 1474.1 [8], a ZC can interact with more
than a thousand such devices. Since devices are represented by
sets of variables in the formal verification system, one device
could have thousands of possible values. All these values make
the model of a system too huge to be computed by existing
verifiers, forming a classical state explosion problem which
has been the blocker for many applications of formal methods.
Although state explosion problems could not be solved
directly, one could carry out the verification on smaller models
if the original problem could be partitioned into much smaller
sub-problems. As long as the verification results of sub-
problems do not affect each other, their results could be
combined to decide the outcome of the verification of the
entire system.
Further analysis revealed to us that the complexity, or the
size of composed state space, depends largely on the number
of variables representing the actually used devices. The in-
teractions between these devices and the systems manifest as
communications, whilst the constraints about the variables are
obtained from the domain knowledge. For example, there are
two kind of devices, block and branch. Block is a segment of
a track. It is base unit of the track in ZC. Branch is an access
that composed by all connected blocks at current state [9].
The blocks are indexed using a block coordinate, whilst the
branches are indexed using a branch coordinate. Any position
on the track can be located using both coordinates. There are
constraints among the coordinate variables.
2According to these observations, we propose two projection
methods for the variables. The Problem Frames (PF)-based
projection decomposes the problem into smaller sub-problems
dealing with collaborating relations, whilst the constraints-
based projection reduces the number of variables in addressing
some of the constraints, even when all the variables are based
on valid sampling data.
In this paper, we hypothesize that properly reducing the
number of variables could reduce the size of state space
without changing the results of verification. By defining the
two projection methods, we have shown the feasibility us-
ing real life cases. Experiments have also been carried out
to demonstrate and confirm our hypothesis. Based on such
experiences, we suggest how to use our methods effectively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II defines ZC and its verification problem, and proves
the basic hypotheses in our work. Section III and section IV
present the PF-based projection and constraints-based projec-
tion methods, respectively. Section V presents an industrial
case study using these two projection methods, with the results
evaluated in section VI. Section VII compares to related work
and section VIII concludes.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND HYPOTHESIS
In this section, firstly we introduce the Zone Controller (ZC)
and its verification problem, and use problem diagrams in the
PF approach [10] to represent them. Then we present the basic
hypotheses of our methods.
A. Problem of Zone Controller
A ZC system is a component of CBTC responsible for
controlling a part of the track among several stations. Its main
purpose is calculating Movement Authority (MA) for all trains
under its control. The MA is calculated by the information that
ZC received from the Vehicle On-Board Computer (VOBC),
the Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) and the Computer
Interlocking system (CI), as well as many sensors along the
track. In our collaborative project with CASCO Ltd., a ZC
system also has other functions such as calculating the safe
location of the train, sorting the trains in the area, and updating
the track occupancy status.
According to the above descriptions, we define all the
signaling devices that can interact with the ZC as parts
of its environment, depicted by a problem diagram [10] in
Figure 1. A ZC system is a machine M which interacts
with its environment E, satisfying the safety requirements
R. Recording the interactions as IS, we formally define the
problem as a four-tuple: P =< M,E, IS,R > [11].
a:E!{f1(v11,...,vnm),f2(v11,...,vnm),...,fi(v11,...,vnm)}
b:M!{g1(v11,...,vnm),g2(v11,...,vnm),...,gj(v11,...,vnm)}
Safety 
Requirements
(R)
Zone Controller (M) Environment (E)
a, b b
Fig. 1. Problem Diagram of Zone Controller
In the problem description, M is the software to be devel-
oped. E consists of many devices (including other systems
in CBTC and sensors along the track). Each state of device
can be indicated by many more variables. For example, on
the track, there is a type of devices named point which
needs 5 variables to describe: one state variable indicates
that its state is in one of the values of normal, reverse,
or unknown; the other four variables, namely nextidx_1,
nextidx_2, nextidx_3, nextidx_4, represent the IDs
of the blocks next to it.
Therefore, the formal description of E is defined by these
devices in the environment of the ZC, with each device defined
by a set of variables:
Definition 1: Environment E is a set of devices, where
each device interacts with ZC, represented by a set of vari-
ables vij , i.e., E = {Di | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, Di = {vij |
1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
Since there are too many devices to be presented in limited
space, instead of enumerating them one by one, Definition 1
uses Di, so does Figure 1.
Depending on the initiator, all the interactions between M
and E can be classified into two sets, a and b (following PF’s
convention). Interactions in a are the phenomena initiated by
the environment E (‘!’ means ‘control’), whilst interactions in
b are initiated by the machine M . The interactions in a and b
are functions of the variables vij(1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m) in
E, denoted by fi(V1, V2, · · · , Vn) and gj(V1, V2, · · · , Vn).
R is a set of safety requirements. In this paper, we define
a safety requirement as a condition that should be met by
the machine to make sure that people is safe. An example of
safety requirement is “a train should never crash on another”.
Generally speaking, R is often written in natural language, and
can be decomposed into sub-requirements (sub-properties).
For instance, the above example can be decomposed into sub-
properties: (1) ZC has to ensure that there does not exist
another train in MA, and (2) VOBC has to ensure that the
speed of the train never exceeds speed curve. In most cases,
the sub-properties can be found in domain standards such
as IEEE 1474.3 [12]. We record the relation between safety
requirements (R) and their sub-properties (Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n) as
R = {P1, P2, · · · , Pi, · · · , Pn}.
B. Verification Problem of Zone Controller
To verify ZC as shown by the problem diagram in Figure 2,
we construct a system of verification machine VM , which
monitors the inputs and outputs of the machine M , and checks
whether the outputs satisfy safety requirements in all reachable
states (i.e. verification requirements R′), and finally generates
a verification report (V R). It is noticed that V R is also a
problem domain, which is the result of problem that excluded
it as a problem domain. However, in the PF approach, the to-
be-built data storage can be modelled as a type of problem
domains called “Designed Domains” denoted by a rectangle
with a single vertical line in the problem diagram. So the
environment of ZC verification problem E′ is composed by
the environment of the ZC (E), the ZC itself (M ) and the
verification report (V R): E′ = E ∪ {M} ∪ {V R}.
The interactions between the environment are as follows.
According to the ZC problem, the interactions between M and
3E are in a and b while a is the inputs and b is the outputs from
the perspective of M . The VM should use a and b accordingly
to judge whether R′ is satisfied. Therefore, the interactions
between E and VM are in a′ which actually monitors the
interactions in a, whilst the interactions between VM and
M are in b′ which reflect b. We can see that a′ and b′ are
actually a and b except that they have different initiators or
receivers. Therefore, there is no need to include a and b in the
problem diagram. For the interactions between VM and V R,
we designate a boolean variable bV alid and a string variable
cExample in c to represent the verification results and the
counter-example, respectively.
ZC Verification
System (VM)
Verification 
Requirements 
(R')
c:VM!{bValid, cExample}
a':E!{f1(v11,...,vnm),f2(v11,...,vnm),...,fi(v11,...,vnm)} b':M!{g1(v11,...,vnm),g2(v11,...,vnm),...,gj(v11,...,vnm)}
ZC System (M)
Verification 
Reprot (VR)
Environment 
(E)a'
b'
c
a'
b'
c
a, b
a:E!{f1(v11,...,vnm),f2(v11,...,vnm),...,fi(v11,...,vnm)} b:M!{g1(v11,...,vnm),g2(v11,...,vnm),...,gj(v11,...,vnm)}
Fig. 2. Problem Diagram of ZC Verification System
To sum up, the verification system of ZC includes the
following parts: the verification system VM , its environment
E′, interactions in a′, b′, and c and requirements R′:
Definition 2: A verification problem is defined as a four-
tuple V P =< VM,E′, IS′, R′ >, where VM is the verifi-
cation system to verify M . E′ is the environment of VM ,
which is the union of E, M and V R. V R is the verification
report of the verification problem, which consists of a boolean
variable bV alid and a string type counter example cExample
if bV alid == false. IS′ = a′∪b′∪c is the set of interactions
between VM and E′, where c is a set including bV alid and
cExample. R′ is the set of verification requirements, which
are to verify whether M satisfies R.
The PF descriptions of ZC and its verification problems
are at a high level. As to their low level implementations, an
implementation language is required. In the railway transporta-
tion area, especially in our collaboration project with CASCO
Ltd., SCADE [13] is widely used. In this paper, we choose
Scade2 as implementation language, designating its semantics
to be our ZC problem and verification problem’s.
C. Hypotheses and Theoretical Validation
The two projection methods proposed in this paper is built
on a hypothesis. That is, reducing the number of variables in
V P could decrease the time cost of the verification without
altering the results. This hypothesis can be divided into two
sub-hypotheses, as listed below.
Hypothesis 1: Reducing the number of variables can de-
crease the time cost of verification.
According to [14], a system’s state space could be computed
by the product of the number of possible values of variables
2According to Esterel Ltd., SCADE refers to the development environment
whilst Scade refers to the modelling language.
therein. Our verification problem V P includes the values E′
(E, M , V R), VM , IS′ and R′. We claim that the state space
of V P can be determined by the variables of E and M . The
reasons are as follows. Firstly, as V R is a designed domain,
its variables do not affect the size of VP, therefore it should
be excluded in estimating the time complexity. Secondly, the
interactions between VM and E, VM and M are actually
interactions between M and E. These interactions are used to
monitor and control variables in the environment, which means
that these interactions are about the variables in E. Finally,
the variables in safety requirements R′ or sub-properties to be
monitored are actually expected effects on the environment.
In fact, they are the variables of declared in the environment
or with the need of computation.
Since M is a black box, one could not tell the private
variables hidden inside. Therefore, one could only reduce
variables in the environment. In this case, it is obvious that
reducing the number of variables could reduce the state spaces,
leading to less time cost.
Hypothesis 2: Reducing dependent variables does not
change the result of verification.
By dependent variables we mean the variable could be
expressed by other variables since the constraints in ZC are
mainly in terms of equations, For example, suppose iHead and
iTail represent the location of the head and tail of a train, and
iLength is its length, they have a constraint (suppose iHead
is larger than iTail), iHead− iTail = iLength. In this case
iLength can be expressed by iHead and iTail, as well as the
other variables. One can say that iHead, iTail and iLength
are dependent variables.
To validate this hypothesis, it is to verify that the semantic of
V P does not change before and after the reduction. According
to [13], two expressions in Scade can be considered as equiv-
alent in semantics if their types, clocks, values are equal. Here
type means the variable type such as integer. Clock is a logic
concept which presents a sequence of time. Clock equivalence
refers to “at the same time”. Value in Scade is a function of
time. When a variable is replaced with an expression, it is
ensured that at any time, the variable and expression share
the same type and value. In this sense, the semantics of V P
before and after the replacement are the same. Therefore, the
reduction will not change the verification result.
III. PROBLEM FRAMES APPROACH BASED PROJECTION
The PF approach is suitable for decomposing a problem into
smaller sub-problems through generalized projection meth-
ods [15]. A projection requires an object and a dimension.
Here, the projected object is the verification problem V P , and
the projected result is a set of smaller verification problems
V P1, V P2, · · · , V Pn. The difficulty in applying this method
directly to the ZC verification problem lies in how to find
a suitable projection dimension. The projection dimension
should be an element that is related to every element defined
in V P including VM , E′ (E,M, V R), R′ and IS′.
In the ZC problems, R is divided into sub-requirements as
sub-properties {P1, P2, · · · , Pn}. For example, the top level
requirement of ZC is “the trains should run safely”, which
4can be divided into two requirements: “the train should not
crash on anything”, and “the train should not derail” [16].
For each sub-property Pi, one could obtain different types
of M (Mi) and related environment Ei from IEEE standard
1474.1 [8] and 1474.3 [12]. They can be listed in Table I
in which builds a mapping among Ei, Mi and Pi. The
relationship among them is that Mi runs in Ei and should
satisfies Pi.
The process to obtain Table I is as follows. Firstly, one has
to find the related chapters for R in Standard 1474.1. In many
cases, the standard provides several situations that the function
has to deal with. For example, a requirement “safe train
separation”, in chapter 6.1.2, lists 8 situations on page 18 with
“The movement authority limit shall be the most restrictive
of the following:”. These situations lead to sub-properties Pi
(1 ≤ i ≤ 8). Secondly, find functions that are related/close
to the requirement R in Standard 1474.3. For example, the
function related to the requirement “safe train separation” is
in chapter 6.3-limit of movement protection and target point
determination. By mapping the functions in chapter 6.3 with
Pi, we obtain Mi. Finally, according to scenarios and design
details in each company, the domain experts could get Ei.
One can see that the process is not easy to be standardized
because it is domain knowledge dependent. But for the do-
main experts, it is not difficult to get the mapping. Different
companies may have different results. In order to keep focus,
in this paper, we only use Table I as part of the inputs.
TABLE I
RELATIONS AMONG SUB-SYSTEMS, SUB-PROPERTIES AND
SUB-ENVIRONMENTS
Sub-system M0 M1 · · · Mi
Sub-property P0 P1 · · · Pi
Sub-environment E0 E1 · · · Ei
Additionally, Pi can correlate to IS′, VM and V R. Since
Ei is determined, the shared phenomena IS′i are also decided.
The IS′i defines a new machine VM . Finally V R can get its
value V Ri after all other elements have been built.
With these relations in-between, Pi has relation to all ele-
ments in V P so that it can be used as a projection dimension.
Therefore, projection is performed along with the sub-property
Pi. Adopting an expression similar to relational algebra, this
formula of problem projection can be defined as follows.
Definition 3: A verification problem V P can be projected
according to a sub-property Pi, after which V P becomes V Pi:
V Pi = piPi(V P )
=< piPi(VM), piPi(E
′), piPi(IS
′), piPi(R
′) >
where piPi is the auxiliary projection operator which could be
defined for different elements in V P as follows.
• Verification system projection operator for VM
piPi(VM) = VMi
The projection defines a new sub-verification system
recording VMi.
• Environment projection operator for E′
piPi(E
′) = E′i
= piPi(E) ∪ {piPi(M)} ∪ {piPi(V R)}
= Ei ∪ {Mi} ∪ {V Ri}
The projection operator chooses Mi and Ei related to Pi
according to table I, and defines V Ri as the result of this
property verification.
• Interaction projection operator for IS′
piPi(IS
′) = {X|X ∈ IS,
receiver(X) ∪ initiator(X) ∈ E′}
where receiver(X) returns the receiver of X , initiator(X)
returns the initiator of X . This operator keeps interactions
initialized or received by domains in Ei.
• Requirement projection operator for R′
piPi(R
′) = P ′i
P ′i is to verify whether Mi satisfies Pi.
To sum up, the verification problem obtained after the
projections V Pi describes four types of elements covering the
system to be verified: the environment, the verification system,
the verification requirements, and the interactions. Amongst
them, the environment obtained after projection is the subset of
original environmental properties, the safety requirements are
the subset of original problem safety requirements. The num-
ber of input variables of the verification system also reduces
with the environment through the interactions. Thus after the
projection, the complexity of such verification system will
decrease, whilst the state space generated by the verification
formula will shrink in size.
IV. CONSTRAINTS BASED PROJECTION
Constraints-based projection aims to analyze the constraints
among variables and tries to find out which redundant variables
can be removed from the system model. This kind of projec-
tion is different from PF-based method because it is at the
variable level while the former is at the functional level. This
section classifies the constraints in ZC, selects the projection
dimension, and defines the projection.
A. Constraints Classification
According to the number of devices variables belong to,
constraints can be classified into internal and external relations.
Internal relations are about variables from the same device,
and external ones are about variables from different devices.
Most of the constraints in ZC systems take the form of
equations, denoted as: f(x1, x2, · · · , xp) = g(y1, y2, · · · , yq),
where {xi} ∩ {yj} = ∅, 1 ≤ i ≤ p, 1 ≤ j ≤ q, and f , g are
functions of variables on left side or right side.
In this paper, we only deal with the constraints in the form
of equations. From the perspective of algebraic equations,
it seems that the left and right hand sides are in the same
position, which means the variables in both sides could
substitute each other. For example, with the same constraint
iHead − iTail = iLength in Section II, iLength can be
replaced by iHead− iTail, and iHead can be substituted by
iTail + iLength.
In reality, however, the positions of variables on the two
sides may not be the same. Due to the efficiency of equation
solvers and cost problem, variables on the left-hand (resp.
right-hand) side can be used to replace the variables on the
right-hand (resp. left-hand) side, but the right (resp. left) ones
5cannot be used to replace the left (resp. right) ones. For
example, there are two coordinates systems in ZC presenting
each location on the track. One is indexed by blocks, and the
other one is indexed by branches. Theoretically, the block
coordinates could transform to the branch coordinates and
vice versa. But in fact, the transformation from branch to
block costs too much. Once needed, one always transforms the
block coordinates to the branch coordinates, but not the other
way around. According to the constraints between these two
coordinate systems, it would cost huge amount of computation
to transform from branch to block, which leads to more
serious state explosion problems. Therefore, for this kind of
constraints only one side variables can be substituted by the
other side ones.
In order to distinguish these two kinds of equality con-
straints, we use two different notations. The first one still uses
“=”, while the second uses “⇒” instead.
B. Projection Dimension Selection
Given a set of constraints, we need to choose a set of
variables as the project dimension, which means to compute
how many variables are needed and how to choose them from
all the variables.
For the first question, according to algebraic equation so-
lution, each independent equation about the set of variables
can be used to remove one variable from the set. When one
has n variables and m equations, if n ≤ m, all variables
can get its value unless there exists a conflict. On the other
side, if n > m, only n−m+ 1 variables are needed. So the
projection dimension is about n−m+1 free variables, denoting
as V = {v1, v2, · · · , vn−m+1}. The conflict mentioned above
means that the equations have no solution. This means that
there must be something wrong in the constraints. Since the
constraints are from the real world, the ideal constraints can
provide an input space which is exactly the same as real world.
In these cases, all constraints should have at least one solution
in theory. The only challenge would be writing down such
constraints. When facing this challenge, one has to discuss
with domain experts about the constraints in order to find
where mistakes were made.
For the second question, one can order these variables by
their importance. The more importance they have, the higher
priority. Suppose that one has a list of decreasing priority,
the first n −m + 1 variables could be selected as projection
dimension. Challenge is now how to build such a priority list.
In practices, we summarize the following guidelines:
• Priorities could be given by domain experts.
• The variables that never occur in any constraint have the
highest priority.
• For the “⇒” constraints, any variable on the right hand
side can only be replaced by variables on the left exist.
Therefore, one could only choose the variables on the
left-hand side.
• For “=” constraints, one can count the occurrences of
each variable. The more occurrences, the higher priority
it has. Another strategy is to compare the value range of
variables and choose the one with possibly fewer values.
To reduce the subjectiveness of the selection process, we
develop Algorithm 1 to automatically obtain the priority list.
The algorithm takes a variable set and a constraint set as
inputs, and outputs a priority list. The basic idea is as follows.
First, it finds the variables that do not exist in any constraints.
These variables are considered as highest priorities. Secondly,
it considers all the “⇒” constraints to obtain all the left hand
side variables. Then it considers the “=” constraints to choose
the more frequently occurred variables. If the occurrences of
two variables are the same, choose the one with fewer values.
Finally, if they have the same value range, select one randomly.
The detailed process is shown in Algorithm 1. The complexity
of the algorithm is O(n2).
Algorithm 1 Priority List Generation Algorithm
Input: variables V S, constraints CS;
Output: priority list PL;
1: Begin:
2: PL⇐ all variables in V S but not mentioned in CS;
3: for each c ∈ CS do
4: if c is an equation with ⇒ then
5: count the occurrence numbers N of variables on left side;
6: else
7: count the occurrence numbers N of all variables;
8: end if
9: end for
10: sort the variables by their occurrence numbers N ;
11: if the first n−m+ 1 variables can be selected then
12: PL⇐ the first n−m+1 variables; // then the priority list is consisted
of these variables
13: else
14: for each variable that share the same occurrence number do
15: calculate the value space of the variable; // choose n − m + 1
variables to consist of PL
16: end for
17: order the variables by the value space;
18: PL⇐ the first n−m+ 1 variables;
19: end if
20: return PL;
21: End;
C. Constraints based Projection Definition
Having obtained the projection dimension
V = {v1, v2, · · · , vn−m+1}, the constraints based projection
can be defined. Back to the verification problem, among the
four elements, E′ and R′ will not change after projection,
only VM and IS′ will be projected into smaller ones by V .
The exact definition is shown as follows.
Definition 4: The verification problem V P can be projected
according to a variable set V , and after the projection V P
becomes V PV , which can be expressed as follows:
V PV = piV (V P )
=< piV (VM), E
′, piV (IS′), R′ >,
where two auxiliary projection operators for different elements
in V P needs defining:
• Verification system projection operator for VM ,
piV (VM) = VMV ,
here VMV checks whether M satisfies R, and can be
named by the users.
• Interaction projection operator for IS′,
piV (IS
′) = IS′V ,
6where IS′V = {y|y = repPhe(x, phyz), x ∈ IS′},
repPhe(x, phyz) returns an interaction obtained by re-
placing the variable in interaction x with phyz, which
phyz can be computed by Algorithm 2.
In the interaction project operator, the variable replacement
could be done automatically. We design Algorithm 2 to
compute every phenomenon in the interaction set IS′ with
variables in the projection dimension V . It tries to solve all
constraints and present all phenomena after projection. By
solving, we mean that it could be expressed by variables in
projection dimension or existing solved variables. Generally
speaking, the algorithm traverses all unsolved constraints
continuously, and if a constraint can be solved, it will be
replaced with an expression in all constraints. The complexity
of this algorithm is O(n).
Algorithm 2 Computation of Phenomena after Projection
Input: constrains C, projection dimension V ;
Output: phenomena after projection R;
1: Begin:
2: while C is not empty do
3: choose c from C randomly;
4: if c is an equation with ⇒ then
5: if all variables on the left of c are in D then
6: for each v on the right of c do
7: add expression of v by D to R; //v is solved
8: D = D ∪ {v}; //v can be used to solve other variables
9: end for
10: c = C − c;
11: end if
12: else
13: if there is only one variable v does not belongs to D then
14: add expression of v by D to R;
15: D = D ∪ {v}; //v is solved
16: C = C − {c}; //v can be used to solve other variables
17: end if
18: end if
19: end while
20: End;
V. CASE STUDY
In this section, we present a sub-system of ZC from a
collaborated project, called CAL EOA. It is used to calculate
MA for each train, i.e., a permission for a train to move to
a specific location with supervision of speed. We apply our
two methods to demonstrate their feasibility. The project track
plan is ”block number is 6, point number is 2, and the max
number of other devices is 4”. This scale track plan is a base
verification unit in their plan that trying to use formal methods
in development process. The problem description is as follows.
Calculating the MA means to calculate the start point
and end point. The start point is the minimum train head,
and the end point is called end of authority (EOA), which
means the maximum range of authorized train movement. The
calculation of EOA relies on the trains (TR), track consisting
of blocks (BL) and branches (BR), signals (SI), buffer zone
(BZ), overlap (OL), traffic direction (TD), and ZC boundary
(ZB). It has to be mentioned that one of the train information,
location not only refers to the coordinates, but also a VTP.
The above devices have 31 variables (for brevity, all vari-
ables here are simplified). They are listed in table II. Among
these variables, 11 constraints are listed in Table III, where
c1−c8 are internal constraints of train, c9 and c10 are internal
constraints of block and branch. Constraint c11 is an external
relation between BL and BR.
TABLE II
VARIABLES IN CAL EOA
Device Variable Explanation
TR
THaPo The Position of max Train Head
THiPo The Position of minimum Train Head
TTaPo The Position of max Train Tail
TTiPo The Position of minimum Train Tail
VHaPo The Position of max VTP Head
VHiPo The Position of minimum VTP Head
VTaPo The Position of max VTP Tail
VTiPo The Position of minimum VTP Tail
TRLen Train Length
CAL EOA EOATyp EOA TypeEOAPos EOA Position
BL
BLpID Block ID on Up Direction
BLnID Block ID on Down Direction
BLLen Block Length
BLiBR The Branch ID of that the Block locates
BR
BRpID Branch ID on Up Direction
BRnID Branch ID on Down Direction
BRLen Branch Length
SI
SIPos Signal Position
SIDir The Direction of the Signal
SISta The State of the Signal
ZCB ZBPos The Position of the ZC BoundaryZBDir A Direction of the ZC Boundary
TD
TDPos The Position of the Traffic Direction
TDDir The Direction of the Traffic Direction
TDSta The State of the Traffic Direction
BZ
BZPos The Position of the Buffer Zone
BZDir The Direction of the Buffer Zone
BZSta The State of the Buffer Zone
OL OLPos The Position of the OverlapOLDir The Direction of the Overlap
According to ISO Standard 1474.3 [12], the safety require-
ment of EOA calculation is divided into 8 sub-properties.
Each sub-property involves different environment as listed in
Table IV.
A. Problem Diagrams of CAL EOA & its Verification Problem
From the problem description of CAL EOA, a problem
diagram of CAL EOA is obtained in Figure 3. To clearly show
the interactions in the problem diagram, we list the interactions
in Table V. From them, the problem description of EOA is:
PCAL EOA =< CAL EOA,E, IS,R >
where
• CAL EOA is the system to be built;
• E includes trains (TR), block (BL), branch (BR), signal
(SI), ZCB (ZB), traffic direction (TD), buffer zone
(BZ) and overlap (OL), i.e.,
E =< TR,BL,BR, SI, ZB, TD,BZ,OL >
• IS is the interaction set between CAL EOA and E.
IS = {ita1, ita2, · · · , ita31}
where itai (1 ≤ i ≤ 31) is defined in Table V.
• R is the safety requirement, with a nature language
description: “the range between the minimum head of
the train and the EOA point its output cannot have any
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DESCRIPTIONS OF CONSTRAINTS
Constraint Description Equation
c1 The distance between THiPo and TTiPo is TRLen THiPo− TTiPo = TRLen
c2 The distance between THaPo and TTaPo is TRLen THaPo− TTaPo = TRLen
c3 The distance between THaPo and THiPo is a constant C1 THaPo− THiPo = C1
c4 The distance between TTaPo and TTiPo is a constant C2 TTaPo− TTiPo = C2
c5 THiPo and V HiPo are the same point THiPo = V HiPo
c6 The distance between V HaPo and V HiPo is a constant C3 V HaPo− V HiPo = C3
c7 The distance between V TaPo and TTaPo is a constant C4 V TaPo− TTaPo = C4
c8 The distance between TTiPo and V T iPo is a constant C5 TTiPo− V T iPo = C5
c9 The block ID in up direction BLpID and down direction BLnID are same BLpID = BLnID
c10 The branch ID in up direction BRpID and down direction BRnID are same BRpID = BRnID
c11 The length of a branch can be calculated by add all length of the blocks belong to it f(BLLen,BLiBR,BRnID)⇒ BRLen
TABLE IV
DESCRIPTIONS OF DIFFERENT SUB-PROPERTIES
Sub-property Description Involving environment Sub-system
P1 There cannot exist any end of track between the minimum train head and EOA. E1 = {TR,BL,BR} M1
P2 There cannot exist any other CBTC-equipped train between the minimum train head
and EOA.
E2 = {TR,BL,BR} M2
P3 There cannot exist any uncontrolled point between the minimum train head and EOA. E3 = {TR,BL,BR} M3
P4 There cannot exist any ZC boundary between the minimum train head and EOA. E4 = {TR,BL,BR,ZB} M4
P5 There cannot exist any discontinuous traffic direction between the minimum train head
and EOA.
E5 = {TR,BL,BR, TD} M5
P6 There cannot exist any buffer zone which does not allow the train to pass between the
minimum train head and EOA.
E6 = {TR,BL,BR,BZ} M6
P7 There cannot exist any branch break between the minimum train head and EOA. E7 = {TR,BL,BR,ZB} M7
P8 There cannot exist any overlap which does not allow the train to pass between the
minimum train head and EOA.
E8 = {TR,BL,BR,OL} M8
TABLE V
INTERACTIONS OF CAL EOA AND ITS VERIFICATION SYSTEM
Interaction ID Initiator Receiver Phenomenon
ita1 (ita32) TR CAL EOA (VM) THaPo
ita2 (ita33) TR CAL EOA (VM) THiPo
ita3 (ita34) TR CAL EOA (VM) TTaPo
ita4 (ita35) TR CAL EOA (VM) TTiPo
ita5 (ita36) TR CAL EOA (VM) VHaPo
ita6 (ita37) TR CAL EOA (VM) VHiPo
ita7 (ita38) TR CAL EOA (VM) VTaPo
ita8 (ita39) TR CAL EOA (VM) VTiPo
ita9 (ita40) TR CAL EOA (VM) TRLen
ita10 (ita41) CAL EOA TR (VM) EOATyp
ita11 (ita42) CAL EOA TR (VM) EOAPos
ita12 (ita43) BL CAL EOA (VM) BLpID
ita13 (ita44) BL CAL EOA (VM) BLnID
ita14 (ita45) BL CAL EOA (VM) BLLen
ita14 (ita46) BL CAL EOA (VM) BLiBR
ita16 (ita47) BR CAL EOA (VM) BRpID
ita17 (ita48) BR CAL EOA (VM) BRnID
ita18 (ita49) BR CAL EOA (VM) BRLen
ita19 (ita50) SI CAL EOA (VM) SIPos
ita20 (ita51) SI CAL EOA (VM) SIDir
ita21 (ita52) SI CAL EOA (VM) SISta
ita22 (ita53) ZB CAL EOA (VM) ZBPos
ita23 (ita54) ZB CAL EOA (VM) ZBDir
ita24 (ita55) TD CAL EOA (VM) TDPos
ita25 (ita56) TD CAL EOA (VM) TDDir
ita26 (ita57) TD CAL EOA (VM) TDSta
ita27 (ita58) BZ CAL EOA (VM) BZPos
ita28 (ita59) BZ CAL EOA (VM) BZDir
ita29 (ita60) BZ CAL EOA (VM) BZSta
ita30 (ita61) OL CAL EOA (VM) OLPos
ita31 (ita62) OL CAL EOA (VM) OLDir
ita63 VM VP bValid
a:TR!{THaPo,THiPo,TTaPo,TTiPo,VHaPo,VHiPo,VTaPo,VTiPo,TRLen}
b:CAL_EOA!{EOATyp,EOAPos} f:ZB!{ZBPos,ZBDir}
c:BL!{BLpID,BLnID,BLLen,BLiBR} g:TD!{TDPos,TDDir,TDSta}
d:BR!{BRpID,BRnID,BRLen} h:BZ!{BZPos,BZDir,BZSta}
e:SI!{SIPos,SIDir,SISta} i:OL!{OLPos,OLDir}
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Environment (E)
Safety 
Requirements 
(R)
b
Branch (BR)
ZC Boundary (ZB)
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Buffer Zone (BZ)
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e
f
g
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Fig. 3. Problem Diagram of CAL EOA
point belonging to one of the eight kind of unsafe point
defined in Table IV”.
As defined in section II, we obtain the problem diagram
of the CAL EOA verification problem in Figure 4. Here we
does not present the interaction between E and M because it
is not necessary in the method. The verification problem of
CAL EOA (VP) is defined as:
V P =< VM,E′, IS′, R′ >
where
8• VM is the verification machine for checking whether
CAL EOA satisfies R′.
• E′ = {CAL EOA} ∪ E ∪ {V R}.
• IS′ = {ita32, · · · , ita63}, where each interaction is
defined in Table V.
• R′ is “to verify that CAL EOA satisfies the safety
requirements R”.
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Environment (E)
Verification 
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(R')
Branch (BR)
ZC Boundary (ZB)
Traffic Direction (TD)
Buffer Zone (BZ)
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CAL_EOA (M)
Verification Report (VP)
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b:CAL_EOA!{EOATyp,EOAPos} g:TD!{TDPos,TDDir,TDSta}
c:BL!{BLpID,BLnID,BLLen,BLiBR} h:BZ!{BZPos,BZDir,BZSta}
d:BR!{BRpID,BRnID,BRLen} i:OL!{OLPos,OLDir}
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Fig. 4. Problem Diagram of CAL EOA Verification System
B. Projection based on Problem Frames Approach
In the application of our PF based projection method, the
projection object is V P , and projection dimension is the sub-
property given in Table IV. There are 8 sub-properties, so we
get 8 projection dimensions. For each dimension Pi, (1 ≤ i ≤
8) , we could get a sub-problem V Pi by using projection. In
the following, we will take P8 as the projection dimension,
and show how we get V P8.
V P8 = piP8(V P )
=< piP8(VM), piP8(E
′), piP8(IS
′), piP8(R
′) >
According to projection operators definition, we obtain:
• piP8(VM) = VM8
• piP8(E
′) = E′ij = E8 ∪ {CAL EOA} ∪ {V R}
= {TR,BL,BR,OL,CAL EOA, V R}
•
piP8(IS
′) = {ita32, · · · , ita40, ita43, · · · , ita49, ita61,
ita62, ita63}
where each interaction is shown in Table V.
• piP8(R
′) = P8
Similarly, we could get the other 7 sub-problems V P1 −
V P7. After the projection, we put these 8 sub-problems in
SCADE, and use its built-in verifier to verify them. They
successfully pass the verification within at most 147 seconds.
C. Projection based on Constraints
For constraints based application, we should first choose the
projection dimension V . According to table II and III, there
are 31 variables and 11 constraints, so a projection dimension
should include 21 variables. Using Algorithm 1, a priority list
is obtained. We choose the first 21 variables to form V :
V = {EOATyp,EOAPos, SIPOs, SIDir, SISta,
ZBPos, ZBDir, TDPos, TDDir, TDSta,BZPos,
BZDir,BZSta,OLPos,OLDir,BLiBR,BLLen,
BRnID, THiPo, TRLen,BLnID}
where the first 15 variables are independent, and the last 6
ones are chosen from dependent variables.
According to the definition of constraint-based projection,
we project the V P as follows:
V PV = piV (V P )
=< piV (VM), E
′, piV (IS′), R′ >
• piV (VM) = VMV
• piV (IS′) = ISV = {ita33, ita40, ita41, ita42, ita44,
ita45, ita46, ita48, ita50, · · · , ita73}
where each interaction is shown either in Table V or VI.
TABLE VI
INTERACTIONS WITH PHENOMENA CHANGED AFTER PROJECTION
Interaction ID Initiator Receiver Phenomenon
ita64 TR VM THiPo+C1
ita65 TR VM THiPo-TRLen+C1
ita66 TR VM THiPo-TRLen
ita67 TR VM THiPo+C3
ita68 TR VM THiPo
ita69 TR VM THiPo-TRLen+C1+C4
ita70 TR VM THiPo-TRLen-C5
ita71 BL VM BLnID
ita72 BR VM BRnID
ita73 BR VM f(BLnID,BLLen,BLiBR)
In the exact process of interaction projection, the phenom-
ena replacement could be computed by Algorithm 2. This
results in new interactions (from ita64 to ita73) as shown in
Table VI. Finally, we put the verification problem V PV into
SCADE. The verification costs 833 seconds.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we design some experiments to evaluate the
two projection methods by answering the following questions:
Q1. What is the performance of these two methods?
Q2. Which scalability issues can be addressed by these
two methods?
Q3. How to use these methods more effectively?
We use two sub-problems of ZC, CAL EOA and
CAL POS for the evaluation. CAL EOA has been de-
scribed in the case study section. With inputs start point,
direction and distance, CAL POS outputs a block coordinate.
Since a block can only reach the blocks next to it, CAL POS
has to periodically check whether the end point is on current
block (it is true only when the distance is reached or there
is no more blocks), and if not, check it on next block. This
sub-problem has three sub-properties: 1) the input and output
coordinates should be on the same track, 2) the distance
between input and output coordinates should be the input
9distance, and 3) the search direction cannot be changed during
the calculation.
In the following experiments, these two sub-problems and
their sub-problems are verified repeatedly on machine config-
urations as shown in Table VII.
TABLE VII
VERIFICATION CONFIGURATION
Sub-problem CAL EOA CAL POS
CPU E5 2620 v3 i7 6700
RAM 64GB 16GB
Operating System WIN7 WIN10
A. Efficiency
Here, the efficiency is measured by the time spent in
the verification. An experiment is designed to evaluate the
efficiency in two steps. In step 1, we chose CAL EOA which
cannot be verified before projection, to see whether its sub-
problem(s) could be verified after the projection. In step 2, we
chose CAL POS which can be verified before, and used it
to compare the efficiency of the verification before and after
the projection.
In fact, step 1 has been reported in the case study of
the previous section. CAL EOA could not be verified by
the built-in verifier in SCADE. It threw an error “Memory
Allocation Failure”, which was caused by state explosion
problem. Even when one uses any one of 8 sub-properties
as R′, it won’t work either. After the projections using the
two proposed methods, it could be verified successfully. The
results are listed in Table VIII. The PF-based method costs
1103 seconds while the constraints-based method costs 833
seconds. To sum up, it can be seen that the projections have
turned the “cannot be verified” sub-problems into “can be
verified” ones.
TABLE VIII
EFFICIENCY OF BOTH METHODS
Method CAL EOA CAL POStime comparison time comparison
no projection NA \ 33s \
PF-based 1103s ↓ 27s 18%↓
Constraints-based 833s ↓ 26s 21%↓
In step 2, firstly we verify CAL POS using the built-in
verifier in SCADE before the projection. It took 33 seconds
for all three properties. After PF-based projection, it took
27 seconds for all three properties. The time it took after
constraints-based projection was 26 seconds. These numbers
can be found in Table VIII.
From Table VIII, one can see that both projection methods
can decrease the verification time by about 20%. This result
confirmed the theoretical conclusion that these two methods
of projection can help decreasing the verification time.
B. Scalability
To generalize the scalability, we studied the relationship
between the variable number and the verification time. We
designed an experiment using the CAL POS. Its variable
number depends on the number of blocks. The computing
formula is NumV = NumB ∗ 9 + 3, where NumV is the
variable number, and NumB is the block number.
We changed NumB from 1 to 12. For each NumV value,
the system were verified three times, and the average time
costs are plotted in Figure 5. From the figure, it can be seen
that the time cost rises very fast when there are more variables
in the environment. Although this was obtained from a sub-
problem of ZC, it did imply that more variables require more
verification time. In other words, reducing variables number of
the system had led to higher efficiency to verify it. The trend
in the experiment indicates that the two proposed methods
helped verifying all sub-problems in ZC.
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C. Usage
There are three ways to use the two proposed projec-
tion methods: (1) using PF-based method only; (2) using
constraint-based method only; and (3) first using PF-based
projection then constraints-based projection. We hypothesize
that the third way is far more efficient. To validate this
hypothesis, we designed a three-step contrast experiment:
(1) project the CAL EOA using the PF-based method; (2)
project the CAL EOA using the constraint-based method;
(3) project the same problem first using the PF-based method
then the constraint-based method.
After each projection, we obtained (1) 8 subproblems; (2)
one problem with a set of 262 constraints; (3) 8 subproblems
with 8 sets of constraints. Then we verified them against the 8
sub-properties listed in Table IV, and obtained the time costs.
After the experiment, the results obtained are shown in
Figure 6. From this figure, one can see that the constraint-
based method achieves a better effect than the PF-based
method in all the 8 subproblems. Moreover, the method that
uses both projection methods achieved the even better effect
compared to the other two alternatives, by reducing at least
21% and 10% time costs respectively.
D. Discussion
Although the proposed methods have achieved expected
effects, we found it further challenging to apply them in real
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industrial settings, i.e., the labour costs and domain knowledge
required to organize these constraints and problem diagrams.
The PF-based projection requires problem diagrams of the
problem to-be dealt with before-hand. Although we have
provided an auxiliary process to obtain problem diagrams [17],
novices need extra time to get familiar with the concepts
of problem diagrams. In both problem diagrams and trans-
portation systems, even experts also need time to extract
corresponding information required. From the perspective of
verification, of course, the time cost is worthy the additional
effort. For example, as shown in the evaluation, the problem
diagram of CAL EOA took us 1 week after 1 month of
learning the ZC specification.
Relatively, the constraints-based method takes constraints
and verification problem as inputs. How to get the constraints
and how the constraints varies according to different experts
are out of the scope of this paper. Even if different experts
come up with different constraints, as long as the constraints
are correct, our method can use these constraints to optimizes
the verification efficiency, achieving good improvements. In
the method, generating priority list can still rely on the domain
experts. In order to reduce the subjectivity, we have created a
priority list generation algorithm for automation. It could also
be used for helping or prompting the domain experts if they
insist on doing it themselves. In summary, both methods have
their applicability conditions. Which one to choose depends
on which input condition is more easily satisfied. If both
conditions are satisfied, we recommend using that PF-based
method first, and the constraints-based method next, which
could achieve better performance according to the experiment
results found in this case study.
VII. RELATED WORK
Recent research in state spaces simplification of verification
problems can be broadly classified into the areas of problem
projection, symbolic model checking, statistical model check-
ing, compositional model checking and modeling of .
a) Problem projection: is a kind of decomposition meth-
ods in PF approach. It was proposed for decomposing com-
plex problems into overlapping subproblems [10]. However,
projections were not automated. To solve this problem, we
proposed a scenario-based projection approach [15] which
uses scenarios as projection dimensions to treat problems as
projection objects, which facilitates automation [18].
Compared with common PF projection approaches, the pro-
jection method developed in this paper is aimed at train control
verification system and adopts any sub-property as a projection
dimension. Customizing to the train transportation domain it
becomes possible to effectively reduce the complexity of train
control systems.
b) Symbolic model checking: is an optimization verifica-
tion technique proposed to solve the state explosion problem
by McMillan [19].
To reduce the number of states, symbolic model checking
does the following. While traversing the verification state
spaces, it uses symbolic states instead of concrete states. To
organize the traversal spaces, different structures have been
proposed. For example, Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams,
and conjunctive normal form (CNF) [20].
However, symbolic model checking cannot be applied to our
ZC verification problem, which has many numerical computa-
tions. Such numerical computations makes it difficult to verify
symbolically. In addition, symbolic model checking lacks
mature/commercial tools which can be embedded directly into
existing design or life cycle tools.
c) Statistical model checking: focuses on stochastic sys-
tems and using statistical methods to checking whether the
system satisfies a property with a probability higher or lower
than a certain threshold [21].
Unlike symbolic model checking, statistical model checking
does not traverse the entire state space. In fact, probabilities are
estimated in Monte Carlo simulations to control the overhead
of verifier in most cases.
Statistical model checking is not suitable for ZC because
ZC is a safety critical instead of a stochastic system. Its fault
probability allowed by SIL-4 is lower than 10−9, and the safety
requirements should be always satisfied.
d) Compositional Model Checking: was initially de-
signed for reducing the complexity of temporal logic
model checking in systems composed of many parallel pro-
cesses [22]. It does not verify a complex program directly,
instead it verifies its parallel processes individually and then
deduces properties of a composition by checking the prop-
erties of individual processes. It has been successfully used
in some processor micro-architecture containing most of the
features of a modern microprocessor [23][24]. Namjoshi from
Bell Laboratories extends it into Parameterized Compositional
Model Checking [25] to verify distributed network protocols
and shared-memory concurrent programs. Meller also pre-
sented a learning-based approach, which generates and verifies
behavioral UML systems in the cloud [26].
Our approach is different from the compositional model
checking. Instead of focusing on the composition of verifi-
cation results, we are focusing on the decomposition process.
As a result, the verification results of our methods do not need
any composition. For any sub-problem which satisfies (or not)
a certain sub-property, we can also tell whether the property
is satisfied because the sub-problem is actually representative
of the problem in our case.
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e) Modeling and Safety of Train Control System: Many
researches have modeled the train control systems to keep
their safety. The most common used approaches are UML-
based ones. Normally, they use a subset of UML or UML
extension to do modeling. For example, Ossami et al. [27]
selected a subset of UML, and investigated a methodology to
model guidelines for building certifiable models under railway
standards. The model was then transformed to B and FSP [28]
in order to validate it with formal semantics. Haxthausen [29]
formally developed and verified a distributed railway control
system based on RAISE method. They reduced the complexity
by separating the system model into a domain model and a
controller model.
Other modeling languages are also involved. Ho¨rste et
al. [30] modeled a train control system using Petri Nets by the
tool Design/CPN. They formally analyzed the capabilities of
the system with simulation. Hansen [31] presented a Vienna
Development Model (VDM) [32] model of an interlocking
system, and described how the model is validated through
simulation in ML (programing language). Wang et al [33]
provided a three layer model based on stochastic hybrid
automata for interlocking systems. Through model simulation
with UPPAAL-SMC, they predicted the accidents caused by
the equipment faults.
To summarize, above modelings of train control systems,
no matter what kinds of modeling language being used, use
either simulation or formal verification to ensure their safety.
Our approach belongs to the formal verification part. Formal
verification has to face the state explosion problem, where
our approach can be a pre-process. Simulation does not have
this kind of problem. However, it only supports a quick and
informal validation of the system model by executing certain
execution paths depending on the initial configuration of the
model, which is not enough for safety-critical systems [34].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper shows that decomposing verification system is
an important step to be effective before the formal verification
of train control systems. Two projection methods have been
proposed for automatically decomposing the ZC verification
system. The main contributions are two folds:
• The Problem Frames (PF)-based projection is defined
using sub-properties as projection dimensions. The ZC
verification system is modeled by a problem diagram by
following the PF approach. Sub-properties relate every
problem element together thereby forming a subproblem.
• The constraints-based projection is defined with a set
of variables as projection dimensions. The variables are
chosen from a set of constraints. An algorithm has been
developed for automatically generating these variables.
We have applied these two methods into real industrial cases
and done some experiments. By comparing the time costs
of the verification before and after using these methods, the
results have shown a great decrease in verification time costs.
Especially in some cases, despite the state explosion problem
arises before the projection but its sub-problems can be still
verified. This makes a great advance in ZC verification work.
For future work we are considering applying the methods
to other systems of CBTC. Since constraints-based projection
seems to be more generalizable found by this case study,
we aim to use this method and to elicit the relationships
between sub-properties and sub-systems used in the PF-based
projection from these systems, as well as from the relevant
industrial standards.
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